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It is increasingly often suggested in literature that a right to unilateral secession, stemming from the right to self-determination of peoples, may arise in case of serious injustices suffered by a people. In those extreme circumstances, an alleged right to unilateral secession operates as an "ultimum remedium". While such a right to remedial secession may well be morally desirable, the question is to what extent it has actually emerged under contemporary international law. The right to self-determination of peoples is generally considered to be one of the most fundamental norms in international law. Outside the context of decolonization, the right to self-determination is a continuous right, which is to be exercised primarily within the framework of an existing State

Recognition of aspiring states from established countries is central to becoming a member state of the international system. Previous research suggests that great power recognition decisions regarding aspiring states rapidly converge toward either recognition or non-recognition, yet great power convergence has still not occurred in the case of Kosovo after more than ten years. Unilateral secessions typically remain wholly unrecognized, since they violate the norm of home state consent, yet Kosovo has now been recognized by more than 100 countries. Why do some countries extend recognition to unilateral secessions, and do so early, whereas others delay recognition or withhold it altogether? In the case of Kosovo, great power influence and contestation, rather than convergence, have played a key role in shaping recognition decisions. We argue that countries in the US sphere of influence, with strong economic and military ties, are more likely to recognize Kosovo and to do so relatively fast, whereas countries influenced by Russia are less likely to recognize Kosovo at all, or to do so only after an extended delay. However, great powers are not equal in influencing other states to adopt their preferred position, since the USA is more powerful than Russia and can benefit from working alongside allies within the Western-oriented world order. We estimate a non-proportional Cox model with new time-varying data on Kosovo recognition and provide evidence that US military ties influenced other countries in extending recognition to unilateral secession.

Recognition of aspiring states from established countries is central to becoming a member state of the international system. Previous research suggests that great power recognition decisions regarding aspiring states rapidly converge toward either recognition or non-recognition, yet great power convergence has still not occurred in the case of Kosovo after more than ten years. Unilateral secessions typically remain wholly unrecognized, since they violate the norm of home state consent, yet Kosovo has now been recognized by more than 100 countries. Why do some countries extend recognition to unilateral secessions, and do so early, whereas others delay recognition or withhold it altogether? In the case of Kosovo, great power influence and contestation, rather than convergence, have played a key role in shaping recognition decisions. We argue that countries in the US sphere of influence, with strong economic and military ties, are more likely to recognize Kosovo and to do so relatively fast, whereas countries influenced by Russia are less likely to recognize Kosovo at all, or to do so only after an extended delay. However, great powers are not equal in influencing other states to adopt their preferred position, since the USA is more powerful than Russia and can benefit from working alongside allies within the Western-oriented world order. We estimate a non-proportional Cox model with new time-varying data on Kosovo recognition and provide evidence that US military ties influenced other countries in extending recognition to unilateral secession.

Liberal egalitarians should support a right to secession while seeking to discourage secessions. The coherence of these apparently opposed stances depends upon three important distinctions that are under-explored in existing secession literature: between the right to secede and the choiceworthiness of secessions; between moral considerations relevant in advising would-be secessionists and those relevant in advising leaders of existing states; and between the legitimacy of a secession and the means that might be legitimately employed in advancing or resisting it. There is a strong but conditional right to secession rooted in the principle of associational freedom, but there are good reasons usually not to exercise it. Would-be secessionists should normally be advised against secession, but leaders of existing states should be advised to grant secessions that satisfy certain conditions. Only certain means are legitimate in resisting even secessions that fail to satisfy these conditions. If necessary the conditions that secessionists are expected to satisfy should be relaxed, provided relaxation takes place in a morally appropriate sequence.

The present Article inquires whether a right to unilateral non-colonial (UNC) secession is grounded in the United Nations (UN) law of self-determination. The Article argues that peoples subjected to deliberate, sustained, and systematic human rights abuses in extremis (e.g., ethnic cleansing, mass killings, or genocide) by the existing state have an international customary law right to UNC secessionist self-determination. This right is coextensive with the "remedial-rights-only" philosophical approach to UNC secession. The Article further argues that in the post-millennial era two developments are likely for the law of UNC secessionist self-determination: first, the right will become available in response to human rights abuses in moderato (political, cultural, or racial discrimination); and second, in the much longer term, the right will become justified not only on remedial grounds but also on liberal philosophical bases. The latter development is predicted to parallel the increase in the number of liberal democratic governments throughout the twenty-first century.

The article reviews the purposes and principles of the u.n. Charter in light of persistent claims voiced in the context of protracted conflicts in the osce area that the principle of self-determination allegedly grants the right to unilateral secession. The drafting history of the Charter indicate that States did not recognise a right to unilateral secession of a part of population of a State as a means of exercising self-determination. Subsequent development of this principle in law and in practice in the decades after the adoption of the Charter to a large extent has been shaped by the original ideas and understanding that went into the Charter. Invalidation at the international level of secessionist claims and actions, collective non-recognition of the resulting situations and abstention from aid or assistance that contributes to their consolidation are among legal and political consequences that have been applied and need to be consistently maintained with regard to the protracted conflicts in the osce area and their settlement processes.

The Spanish constitution proclaims Spanish unity to be indissoluble and, therefore, does not recognize the right to secession. However, this prevision could be reformed, even if it involves rather complicated processes. All said, it is good to bear in mind that different internal and international jurisdictions have recognized that national communities have a right to decide their political future collectively; including secession, understood to be a political aspiration, protected by the democratic principle of freedom of speech, and the right to participate can direct the modification of the constitutional order of a state, in a way that is legal and agreeable to all involved. However, there are cases of national communities that do not recognise that right, or the parent nation shows no desire to negotiate the terms of an improved accommodation of their political status, or allow a referendum to be held for this effect. In these cases, the recent practice of some States as well as comparative law, show the viability, under certain conditions, of a unilateral declaration of independence.

The Spanish constitution proclaims Spanish unity to be indissoluble and, therefore, does not recognize the right to secession. However, this prevision could be reformed, even if it involves rather complicated processes. All said, it is good to bear in mind that different internal and international jurisdictions have recognized that national communities have a right to decide their political future collectively; including secession, understood to be a political aspiration, protected by the democratic principle of freedom of speech, and the right to participate can direct the modification of the constitutional order of a state, in a way that is legal and agreeable to all involved. However, there are cases of national communities that do not recognise that right, or the parent nation shows no desire to negotiate the terms of an improved accommodation of their political status, or allow a referendum to be held for this effect. In these cases, the recent practice of some States as well as comparative law, show the viability, under certain conditions, of a unilateral declaration of independence.